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Abstract
I examine a situation where a …rm has to choose to locate a new
factory in one of several jurisdictions. The value of the factory may dif-
fer among jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held
by each jurisdiction. Jurisdictions compete for the location of the new
factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already
incurred on infrastructure, commitments to spend on infrastructure,
tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two ele-
ments that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable
because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that
values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that
the expected total amount paid to the …rm under a large family of
arrangements. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism
– that is, the mechanism that guarantees that the …rm chooses the
jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total
expected payment to the …rm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante
¤I gratefully acknowledge the …nancial support of CNPQ (Grant no. 300065/93-0) and
ARC.
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sense – can be implemented by running a standard auction and sub-
sidizing participation.
JEL Classi…cation: H3, H71, H73.
Keywords: …scal wars; asymmetric information.
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1 Introduction
Competition among states for new businesses is nothing new. It is very likely
a feature of any federative regime.1 However, there is a public perception
that such bidding wars are escalating and that government intervention may
be called for.2 Analysts point out that the costs of attracting businesses
are increasing. Common examples include the construction of a new chip
factory by Micron Technology in Utah at a cost of around $80 million and
the Mercedes Bens new factory in Alabama at a cost for the state of about
$250 million. Such competition is also common outside the U.S., both in
developed and emerging economies.
The Region, a quarterly magazine of the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis, reported on the proceedings of a conference on “The Economic
War Among the States,” held in 1996. Among several contributions, there
was a speci…c proposal made by Burstein and Rolnick (1995) for congress
to enact legislation to prevent states from using subsidies and tax incentives
to compete with one another for businesses. Another example of a similar
reaction to interstate competition can be found in the Memorandum of Eco-
nomic Policies (1999), a document from the Brazilian government outlining
major policy reforms. This document points out that one of the aims of the
proposed tax reform that introduces a value added tax is to eliminate the
scope for …scal war among states.
1For example, interstate tax competition was discussed in the mid-80s in the context
of the 1984 Treasury Department’s proposal to former Presidente Reagan for tax reform.
See, for example, Shannon (1986), McLure (1986) and Wildasin (1986).
2For example, see State Senator Charles Horn, Ohio, call for a State Legislative Con-
ference on “Mitigating the Wasteful Economic Development Incentive Wars between the
States, ” in February 1996. Available at the site http://www.senate.state.oh.us/horn.
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There are two opposing views of this competition among states. One
view is that competition among states play a similar role of that played by
competition among …rms. A second opposing view is that incentives wars
are a zero-(or negative) sum game. Both arguments on their own might be
misleading. The latter presumes that the same amount of investment will
have the same economic impact in any location. The former, ignores that
competition among states for businesses may divert resources from other
usages, such as education and health.
In contrast, in this paper I develop a framework that allows me to accom-
modate both views. In particular, I examine a situation where a …rm has
to choose to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions. The value
of the factory may di¤er among jurisdictions and it depends on the private
information held by each jurisdiction. This private information may take,
for example, the form of a consultant’s report. For simplicity we consider
that jurisdictions o¤ers are conveyed in dollar amounts. These o¤ers may
represent expenditures already incurred on infrastructure, commitments to
spend on infrastructure, tax incentives or even cash payments.
Given that di¤erent locations have potentially di¤erent values for the
factory, economic e¢ciency dictates that the factory should be located in the
jurisdiction that values it the most. However, we model competition itself as
wasteful. The idea is that the …rm has already decided to build a new factory
in one of the jurisdictions and will do so even if it has no tax incentives. For
simplicity, we assume that any incentives paid by the …rm by one or more
jurisdictions represent a welfare loss (e.g., the …rm’s shareholders live outside
the n jurisdictions).
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We consider di¤erent types of competition such as an open auction-like
mechanism where jurisdictions openly announce their o¤ers, a sealed-o¤er
competition where the winner is the jurisdiction that makes the highest o¤er,
and an arrangement where jurisdictions invest simultaneously in infrastruc-
ture (that has no use if the factory is not located there) and the winning
jurisdiction is the one that spends the most.
The novel feature of this analysis is that it combines two elements that
are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want
the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but
competition in itself is wasteful. We resort to auction theoretical techniques
3 to show that the expected total amount paid to the …rm under a large
family of arrangements, including all three described above, is the same.
This contrast with the view that the speci…c format of the competition may
matter (see, for example, Taylor (1992)).
Moreover, we show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism – that is, the
mechanism that guarantees that the …rm chooses the jurisdiction with the
highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the
…rm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense – can be implemented by
running a standard auction and subsidizing participation. This solution is
similar in spirit to the proposal of Burstein and Rolnick (1995) to eliminate
interstate competition by taxing real and imputed income from public spend-
ing. The distinction is that competition needs to take place to ensure that
the factory is located e¢ciently.
3Klemperer (2000) provides an excellent exposition of the link between the theory of
auctions and standard economics. Boylan (2000) applies the insighs from the optimal
auction literature to examine lobbying.
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2 The Model
A …rm has decided to build a new factory and will choose to locate in one of
the existing n local jurisdictions. Competition for the new business can
take a number of di¤erent formats. For example, jurisdictions can o¤er
tax incentives (such as abatements, exemptions, reductions and moratoria),
tax-related incentives (such as investment and tax credits, research and de-
velopment tax incentives, and accelerated depreciation of equipment) and
non-tax incentives (such as creating infrastructure, …nancing subsidies and
customized worker training). For simplicity we consider that any recourses
spent on this competition are waisted. (For example, any incentives are fully
translated into extra pro…ts for the …rm’s shareholders who are located out-
side the n jurisdictions). The …rm chooses to locate in the jurisdiction that
o¤ers the best deal.
Moreover, the contest itself can be organized in di¤erent ways. It may be
the case that the competition consumes no resources as it takes the form of
o¤erings of inducements that take e¤ect only if the …rm chooses to locate in
the speci…c jurisdiction (e.g., as in Oates and Schwab (1988)). Alternatively,
competition may also take the form of creating infrastructure (e.g., as in
Taylor (1992)).4
Each jurisdiction i receives a private signal Si where the Si’s are indepen-
dent draws from a distribution F (¢) with positive density f(¢) in the support
4For the reader who is familiar with the theory of auctions, the former arrangement
is equivalent to a …rst-price auction where the winner is the bidder with the highest bid
and she pays her bid. The later arrangement is equivalent to an all-pay auction where
the winner is the bidder with the highest bidder but all bidders pay their bids (even those
who lost the auction).
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[0; ¹S]. Jurisdictions are assumed risk-neutral and the value of the new factory
for location i is given by5
vi(S1; :::; Si; :::; Sn) = aSi + b
X
i 6=j
Sj
with 1 > a ¸ b ¸ 0: We will denote by s1 the highest actual signal, s2
the second highest actual signal and so on. Although own’s signal is private
information, the value function is common knowledge. It is also known by all
jurisdictions that the …rm’s reservation value is equal to zero, that is, it will
choose to build the factory even when no jurisdiction o¤ers any incentives.
In this case, we assume for simplicity that the …rm decides where to locate
by using a lottery that assigns equal probability to each jurisdiction.
This formulation captures the notion that the true value of the new fac-
tory for each locality is not known with certainty at the time of the compe-
tition. The value of the factory for jurisdiction i is generally a function of its
own signal and the signals of other jurisdictions. One can think of the signal
as being a consultant’s estimate of the income stream to be generated by the
new factory.
Special cases include independent private values (when vi(S1; :::; Si; :::; Sn) =
vi(Si) or b = 0) and pure common values (when vi(S1; :::; Si; :::; Sn) = vj(S1; :::; Sj; :::; Sn)
or a = b). In the independent private values case the value of the factory for
each jurisdiction is a function only of its own signal. In the pure common
values case the value of the factory is the same for all players (for any given
vector of private signals).
5This formulation is similar to that of Klemperer (1999), appendix D.
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3 Equilibrium Behavior in the jurisdiction com-
petition
We start by examining the jurisdictions’ equilibrium behavior under the com-
petition arrangement described below. This arrangement is simply an arti-
…ce to obtain the equilibrium behavior under the more standard competition
arrangements mentioned in the previous section.
Under this arrangement, the …rm announces that will locate the factory
in the jurisdiction that o¤ers the best deal – as summarized by a single dollar
bid. The …rm then organizes an ascending o¤er mechanism that works as
follows; the …rm announces a minimum acceptable o¤er (e.g., zero) and raises
the minimum o¤er continuously in an electronic clock. Jurisdictions bid by
pressing a button. A jurisdiction drops out from the competition by stopping
to press the button. The winner of the competition is last the jurisdiction
pressing the button and it has to o¤er the …rm an incentive package worth
the dollar amount at which the next-to-last jurisdiction has dropped out.
How will …rms behave in the symmetric equilibrium of this competition?
Can we predict the expected winning o¤er? Our starting point is the recog-
nition that in a symmetric equilibrium each jurisdiction leaves the race where
it would be indi¤erent between winning or losing. Therefore, the …rst juris-
diction to drop out from the competition will do so at o¤er
(a+ (n¡ 1)b) sn
This would be the actual value to all jurisdictions if all had the lowest signal.
The remaining jurisdictions can observe this so that the next jurisdiction
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leaves the competition when the o¤er reaches
bsn + (a + (n¡ 2)b)sn¡1:
This would be the actual value of the second to drop out; this jurisdiction’s
value is equal to the signal of the jurisdiction that was the …rst to drop out
(times b) plus the value that arises when all other n¡ 2 jurisdiction have the
same signal. Similarly the third jurisdiction to drop out from the race will
do so at the o¤er
bsn + bsn¡1 + (a+ (n¡ 3)b)sn¡2:
This process is now familiar to the reader who can predict that the next-to-
last jurisdiction will drop out at o¤er
o¤ = b(sn + sn¡1 + :::+ s3) + (a + b)s2: (1)
Note that 1 represents the …nal o¤er made by the winner to the …rm in the
symmetric equilibrium. We can now compute the expected value of the …nal
o¤er to the …rm by the winning jurisdiction. It is simply the expected value
of o¤:
Now consider the following competition arrangement. All jurisdictions
submit their o¤ers simultaneously through a sealed bid. Although the winner
is the jurisdiction with the highest o¤er, it pays the equivalent to the second
highest o¤er. As in the ascending mechanism, each jurisdiction is willing to
o¤er any amount up to its expected value conditional on winning the object
and being tied with another jurisdiction with the same signal. However,
under this arrangement the jurisdiction cannot observe the (n ¡ 2) losing
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o¤ers and, therefore, has to estimate them. Thus, jurisdiction i with signal
si o¤ers:
o^i(si) = b(n¡ 2)E[x j x < si] + (a + b)si:
Using the de…nition of the conditional expectation we obtain
o^i(si) = b(n¡ 2)
siR
0
xf(x)dx
F (si)
+ (a + b)si: (2)
Using integration by parts we can write i’s o¤er in a second-highest-o¤er
mechanism as
o^i(si) = (a+ b(n¡ 1))si ¡ b(n¡ 2)
siR
0
F (x)dx
F (si)
: (3)
We can now proceed to compute the expected winning o¤er and the
jurisdiction’s equilibrium behavior under the more conventional competition
arrangements. We will do so by invoking one of the most celebrated results
of auction theory, namely, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) . This
result establishes that with risk-neutral agents any two mechanisms that in
the symmetric equilibrium
1. allocate the good to the agent with the highest valuation; and
2. yields the same expected gain for the agent with the lowest possible
signal.
This theorem was demonstrated by Vickrey (1961) for a special case and
generalized later by, among others, Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson
(1981) and Bulow and Klemperer (1996).
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It is immediate that both the ascending and the second-highest-o¤er
mechanisms described above satisfy the hypothesis of the RET. Moreover,
the more familiar arrangements where jurisdictions o¤er inducements that
takes e¤ect only if the …rm chooses to locate in the speci…c jurisdiction (pay-
your-o¤er competition) and where competition take the form of creating in-
frastructure simultaneously and locating the factory at the jurisdiction with
the highest amount invested (all-pay competition) also satisfy the conditions
of the RET. In both cases, the jurisdiction with the highest o¤er wins the
competition in the symmetric equilibrium and the expected pro…ts of the
jurisdiction with the lowest possible valuation is the same – the probability
that this jurisdiction wins the competition is zero under both arrangements.
In the following propositions we make use of the RET to characterize the
equilibrium behavior in these mechanisms.
Proposition 1 A jurisdiction i with signal si o¤ers
¹oi(si) = a
0BB@si ¡
siR
0
F (x)n¡1dx
F (si)n¡1
1CCA + b(n¡ 1)
0BB@si ¡
siR
0
F (x)dx
F (si)
1CCA (4)
in a symmetric equilibrium of the pay-your-o¤er competition and o¤ers
~oi(si) =
a
0@F (si)n¡1si ¡ siZ
0
F (x)n¡1dx
1A+ b(n¡ 1)F (si)n¡2
0@F (si)si ¡ siZ
0
F (x)dx
1A
(5)
in a symmetric equilibrium of the all-pay competition.
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Proof. An implication of RET is that a jurisdiction’s expected pay-
ment is the same under any mechanism satisfying its hypothesis. Thus, we
…rst compute the expected payment of payment of jurisdiction i with sig-
nal si conditional on winning a second-highest-o¤er competition. Under this
arrangement, i’s expected payment is simply the expected value of the largest
o¤er among its (n¡ 1) opponents conditional on si being the highest signal.
Using (3), this expected payment is equal to
siR
0
24(a + b(n¡ 1))x ¡ b(n¡ 2) xR0 F (y)dyF(s)
35 (n¡ 2)F (x)n¡1f (x)dx
F (si)n¡1
(6)
Note that integration by parts yields
siZ
0
[(a+ b(n¡ 1)) x] (n¡ 2)F (x)n¡1f(x)dx = (7)
(a + b(n¡ 1))
0@F (si)n¡1si ¡ siZ
0
F (x)n¡1dx
1A
and :
siZ
0
2664b(n¡ 2)
xR
0
F (y)dy
F (s)
3775 (n¡ 2)F (x)n¡1f (x)dx = (8)
b(n¡ 1)
0@F (si)n¡2 siZ
0
F (x)dx¡
siZ
0
F (x)n¡1dx
1A
Replacing (7) and (8 into (6) yields i’s expected payment condition on win-
ning a second-highest-o¤er competition:
a
0BB@si ¡
siR
0
F (x)n¡1dx
F (si)n¡1
1CCA + b(n¡ 1)
0BB@si ¡
siR
0
F (x)dx
F (si)
1CCA :
Given that in a pay-your-o¤er competition, each jurisdiction pays her o¤er
conditional on winning, her o¤er is precisely her expected payment that is
given by the expression above, which is equal to (4). Note that i’s expected
payment in a pay-your-o¤er competition is equal to its o¤er times the prob-
ability of winning (that is, the probability that i’s has the highest signal
F (si)n¡1:
Now we use the RET again to argue that i’s o¤er in a all-pay competition
is the expression above times F (si)n¡1: To see why, each jurisdiction pays
her o¤er irrespectively of winning the all-pay competition. By the RET, its
expected payment is …xed and equal to2664a
0BB@si ¡
siR
0
F (x)n¡1dx
F (si)n¡1
1CCA + b(n¡ 1)
0BB@si ¡
siR
0
F (x)dx
F (si)
1CCA
3775 :F (si)n¡1
so this must be i’s o¤er in a symmetric equilibrium, which coincides with (5)
after cancellations.
Expression (4) has an intuitive explanation based on insights from auction
theory. The …rst term of (4) represents the private component of i’s o¤er. It
su¢ces for i to outbid the opponent with the highest signal among her (n¡1)
opponents. Therefore, i shades its o¤er by the di¤erence between its signal
and the expected value of the highest of the other signals (multiplied by a, the
coe¢cient on the private value component). The second term (4) represents
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the public component of i’s o¤er. In addition, Jurisdiction i also shades its
o¤er by the di¤erence between its signal and the other signals to take into
account the winner’s curse. Expression (5) has a similar interpretation along
auction theoretical lines.
4 The ex-ante optimal mechanism
In addition to being able to compute equilibrium behavior under any com-
petition arrangement satisfying the RET, we are also able to compute the
expected total payment (ETP ) to the …rm across all such arrangements. It
su¢ces to compute the expected value of the highest o¤er for example in a
pay-your-o¤er competition:6
ETP =
¹SZ
0
2664a
0BB@si ¡
siR
0
F (y)n¡1dy
F (si)n¡1
1CCA + b(n¡ 1)
0BB@si ¡
siR
0
F (y)dy
F (si)
1CCA
3775 (n¡1)F (x)n¡1f (x)dx
A natural question to ask is then what is then whether a social planner
can choose a mechanism where the factory will be located at the jurisdiction
with the highest value for it, minimizes the total amount spent on the com-
petition and at the same time balances the budget in the ex-ante sense. By
the revelation principle, it su¢ces to examine direct revelation mechanisms
satisfying incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
We what follows I pursue an approach similar to that in Bulow and Klem-
perer (1996). De…ne Pi(s1; :::; si; :::; sn) as the probability that jurisdiction i
6By the RET, this should yield the same expected winning o¤er as in a second-highest-
o¤er competition (obtained by computing the expected value of the second highest o¤er)
or in a all-pay competition (obtained by computing the expected value of the sum of all
o¤ers).
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wins the competition in any such mechanism as a function of the jurisdictions’
realized signals . The individual rationality constraint requires that locations
are not worse o¤ from participating in the mechanism, that is, every location
i’s expected surplus as a function of its signal, for all possible signals, must
satisfy:
¼i(si) ¸ 0 8i;8si (IR)
The incentive compatibility constraint requires that i’s expected surplus
as a function of its signal, ¼i(si);to satisfy for all realized signals si and s0i
and for all i, i = 1; :::; n:
¼i(si) ¸ ¼i(s0i)+Z
¢ ¢ ¢
Z ¹S
0
Ã
asi + b
X
i 6=j
Sj ¡ as0i ¡ b
X
i6=j
Sj
!
£ (IC)
Pi(S1; :::; s0i; :::; Sn)f (S1):::f(Si¡1)f(Si+1):::f(Sn)dS1:::dSi¡1dSi+1:::dSn
This constraint simply guarantees that it is in jurisdiction i’s best interest
to truthfully reveal its signal. The (IC) constraint implies that
d¼i(si)
dsi
=
Z
¢ ¢ ¢
Z ¹S
0
aPi(S1; :::; si; :::; Sn)f (S1):::f(Si¡1)f(Si+1):::f(Sn)dS1:::dSi¡1dSi+1:::dSn
(9)
Integrating (9) we obtain:
¼i(si) = ¼i(0)+Z si
0
Z
¢ ¢ ¢
Z ¹S
0
aPi(S1; :::; Si; :::; Sn)f(S1):::f(Si¡1)f(Si+1):::f(Sn)dS1:::dSi:::dSn:
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This is jurisdiction i’s expected surplus in equilibrium conditional on its
signal being si. Therefore, from the point of view of the central planner, who
does not know i’s signal, the total expected surplus from the n jurisdictions
is equal to:
nX
i=1
Z ¹S
0
[(¼i(0)+
Z si
0
Z
¢ ¢ ¢
Z ¹S
0
aPi(S1; :::; Si; :::; Sn)f(S1):::f(Si¡1)f(Si+1):::f(Sn)dS1:::dSi:::dSn]f (si)dsi
After integration by parts, we can write the expected total surplus of the n
jurisdictions as :
¦ =
nX
i=1
¼i(0)+
nX
i=1
Z
¢ ¢ ¢
Z ¹S
0
(1¡ F (Si)) aPi(S1; :::; Si; :::; Sn)f(S1):::f (Si):::f(Sn)dS1:::dSi:::dSn
(10)
The total expected payment to the …rm can also be computed as it is
the di¤erence between the expected total surplus in this economy (that is,
the expected value of the factory) and the total expected surplus of the n
jurisdictions:
¡¦+
nX
i=1
Z
¢ ¢ ¢
Z ¹S
0
Ã
aSi + b
X
i 6=j
Sj
!
Pi(S1; :::; Si; :::; Sn)f(S1):::f (Si):::f(Sn)dS1:::dSi:::dSn
(11)
Replacing (10) into (11) we obtain that the total expected payment to the
…rm from any competition satisfying (IC) and (IR) is equal to
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¡
nX
i=1
¼i(0) +
nX
i=1
Z
¢ ¢ ¢
Z ¹S
0
Ã
aSi + b
X
i 6=j
Sj ¡ (1¡ F (Si))a
!
£
Pi(S1; :::; Si; :::; Sn)f (S1):::f(Si):::f (Sn)dS1:::dSi:::dSn (12)
The central planner’s problem is to choose a mechanism satisfying the
(IC) and (IR) constraints to minimize (12) subject to
C1 …rm’s expected pro…ts are greater or equal to zero.
C2 locate the factory at the jurisdiction with the highest signal; and
C3 balance its budget.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal mechanism satisfying
the conditions above.
Proposition 2 The optimal mechanism is such where the central planner
runs any standard competition (e.g., a pay-your-o¤er competition), imposes
a tax on the …rm equal to total expected payment to the …rm and pays a
subsidy to each one of the n jurisdictions that is equal to:
1
n
nX
i=1
Z
¢ ¢ ¢
Z ¹S
0
Ã
aSi + b
X
i 6=j
Sj ¡ (1 ¡ F (Si)) a
!
£ (13)
Fi(Si)n¡1f(S1):::f(Si):::f(Sn)dS1:::dSi:::dSn
Proof. We concentrate on mechanisms satisfying the (IC) and (IR con-
straints. Any such mechanism that locates the factory at the jurisdiction
with the highest signal must be such that the probability that i wins the
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competition is equal to the probability of i being the highest signal, namely,
Fi(Si)n¡1: From inspection of (12), the above subsidy implies that the central
planner just balances its budget and that the …rm’s total expected pro…ts are
equal to zero. To implement this mechanism the central planner runs any
standard competition, e.g., a pay-your-o¤er competition. It is straightfor-
ward to check that in any such competition the factory is located at the
jurisdiction with the highest signal and the constraints (IC) and (IR are sat-
is…ed. The subsidy does not change jurisdiction i’s behavior as it does not
depend on i’s private information.
There are several features of this mechanism that deserves our attention.
First, one needs to run a competition among jurisdictions, that may take
any of the formats mentioned earlier, in order to ensure that the factory
is located in the jurisdiction that values it the most. Note that the result
is quite general as it indicates that any competition arrangement will work
as long as in such arrangement the factory is allocated in the jurisdiction
that makes the highest o¤er (and subject to the technical condition that the
jurisdiction with the lowest possible valuation has zero probability of being
chosen by the …rm).
Second, the tax on the …rm and the subsidy paid to the jurisdictions
cannot be based on the actual signals observed by the jurisdictions and should
instead based on expected values. This implies that the …rm might lose
money ex-post. Depending on the competition arrangement (e.g., an all-pay
competition), jurisdictions might lose money ex-post as well. Therefore, it
might not be feasible to implement such mechanism.
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5 Conclusion
This paper examines the competition among jurisdictions for a new business
when the value of this new business is not known at the time that the compe-
tition takes place. The analysis combines the notion that competition might
be desirable for the location of the factory in the jurisdiction that values it
the most with the idea that competition in itself might be wasteful. Using
the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, I argue that the expected total amount
paid to the …rm under a large family of arrangements is the same. Using
the revelation principle and the tools developed by Bulow and Klemperer
(1996), I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism can be implemented by
running a standard auction and subsidizing participation. The emphasis is
in that competition needs to take place to ensure that the factory is located
e¢ciently.
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